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 Another Look at Growth and Defense in Less
 Developed Countries
 David Lim
 Griffith University
 Introduction
 In a recent paper, Benoit claimed that there was sufficient evidence to
 show that defense spending encouraged the economic growth of 44 less
 developed countries (LDCs) over the period 1950-65.1 However, some
 doubt must be cast on this claim, as the results obtained were not very
 clear-cut. In view of this doubt, this paper attempts to reexamine the
 relationship between defense and growth for a bigger group of LDCs
 (54) over a more recent period (1965-73) within an explicit conceptual
 framework. The analysis is also carried out at the regional level for 21
 African, 13 Western Hemisphere, 11 Asian, and 9 Middle Eastern and
 southern European LDCs.2
 Formulation of Relationship
 We begin with the explicit Harrod-Domar capital-centered growth
 equation in a general form:
 Y, = g IOCR, IIY), (1)
 where Y, is the growth rate of the real GDP, IOCR the incremental
 output-capital ratio, and 1/Y the gross domestic investment to GDP
 1 Emile Benoit, "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries," Economic Devel-
 opment and Cultural Change 26 (January 1978): 271-80. See also Emile Benoit, Defense
 and Economic Growth in Developing Countries (Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1973).
 2 Africa: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya,
 Malawi, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tan-
 zania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia; Western Hemisphere: Argentina, Barbados,
 Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru,
 Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela; Asia: Afghanistan, Burma, Hong Kong, India,
 Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand; Middle
 East and southern Europe: Cyprus, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
 Syria, and Turkey. The data are taken from the World Bank, World Tables 1976 (Balti-
 more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).
 ? 1983 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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 ratio. The traditional argument against defense expenditure is that, for
 a given surplus of production over consumption, it diverts funds from
 investment purposes and so hinders the growth process. For a closed
 Harrod-Domar economy, a higher defense expenditure to GDP ratio
 (DIY) means a lower investment ratio (I/Y), and, with a given IOCR,
 must imply a lower growth rate of output (Yg). The trade-off between
 defense and investment expenditures is presented, in a general form,
 as:
 I/Y = f(DIY), (2)
 where IIY and DIY are expected to be negatively related.
 Foreign capital inflow may enable a country to increase its defense
 and investment expenditures at the same time. The absence, then, of a
 negative relationship between I/ Y and DI/Y may be due to the presence
 of foreign capital inflow, which enables both investment and defense
 expenditures to be increased simultaneously. The lack of a negative
 relationship does not, on its own, show that defense spending does not
 compete with investment expenditure for scarce domestic funds. In
 order to isolate the effect of defense spending on economic growth per
 se, we incorporate foreign capital inflow into our trade-off model to
 rewrite equation (2) as:
 I/Y = f(DIY, F/Y), (3)
 where FlY is the foreign capital inflow to GDP ratio. For a given DIY,
 the higher F/Y is the higher I/Y will be, so that F/Y and I/Y are hy-
 pothesized to be positively related.
 The substitution of equation (3) into equation (1) gives us the
 following estimating equation:
 Yg = f(IOCR, DIY, FlY), (4)
 where Yg is expected to be negatively and positively related to D/Y and
 F/Y, respectively.
 The actual estimating equations used are:
 Yg = f(IOCR, DIY, FIS) (4a)
 Yg = f(IOCR, DIGE, FIS). (4b)
 The deficit on current account to gross national saving ratio, FIS, is
 preferred to F/Y as it brings out more directly the impact that different
 sources of funds have on investment and defense expenditures. The
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 defense expenditure to total government current and capital expendi-
 ture, DIGE, is used as an alternate to DIY as it is a more direct measure
 of the defense effort.
 The average annual growth rate of the real GDP for the period
 1965-73, Yg, is calculated by the least-squares regression method. The
 incremental output-capital ratio, IOCR, is for the period 1968-73.
 Values for DIY, DIGE, and F/S are obtained by averaging the figures
 for 1965, 1970, and 1973.
 Empirical Results
 Equations (4a) and (4b) were estimated, with intercepts, for six differ-
 ent groups of LDCs by ordinary least-squares regression analysis.
 Both linear and logarithmic functions were obtained, with the latter
 producing by far the better results. These are given in table 1 and
 table 2.
 There is support for the contention that defense spending is detri-
 mental to economic growth. When the analysis was carried out for the
 entire sample of 54 LDCs the regression coefficient for DIGE is nega-
 tive and statistically significant. The adverse effects of defense spend-
 ing on growth became more apparent when the nine Middle Eastern
 and southern European countries were excluded from the sample. The
 regression coefficients of DIY and DIGE have negative signs and are
 both significant. When taken with the results obtained for the sample of
 Middle Eastern and southern European LDCs, where F/S came out
 with significant and positive coefficients, the results suggest that for the
 LDCs that are neither Middle Eastern nor southern European there
 was insufficient foreign capital inflow to offset the adverse effect that a
 diversion of domestic funds from investment projects had on economic
 growth.
 Our results also show marked interregional differences in the rela-
 tionship between defense and growth. Economic growth in the African
 and the Western Hemisphere LDCs in the sample seemed to be ad-
 versely affected by defense spending. On the other hand, there is no
 relationship between defense and growth in the other two groups of
 LDCs. The dangers of generalizing about the influence of defense
 spending on economic growth across countries are, therefore, obvious.
 The regression coefficients of IOCR have the expected positive
 sign and are all statistically significant. This suggests that, for a given
 investment ratio made possible by a surplus of the sum of local and
 foreign funds over defense expenditure, a higher productivity of capital
 tends to produce a higher rate of economic growth.
 Our results, therefore, show that defense spending is detrimental
 to economic growth in LDCs, a conclusion that is diametrically oppo-
 site to that reached by Benoit.
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 TABLE 1
 LOGARITHMIC CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH: EQUATION (4a)
 Total less Middle Middle East
 East and Southern Western and Southern
 Independent Total Europe Africa Hemisphere Asia Europe
 Variables (54 LDCs) (45 LDCs) (21 LDCs) (13 LDCs) (ll LDCs) (9 LDCs)
 Constant ......... 2.557 2.555 2.690 2.334 2.481 2.946
 (20.952)* (17.840)* (11.224)* (17.221)* (5.794)* (8.044)*
 IOCR ........... 1.408 1.424 1.277 1.930 1.376 1.152
 (8.695)* (7.717)* (5.372)* (5.856)* (2.642)** (3.497)*
 D/Y ......... - .049 - .001 - .096 -.138 .171 -. 125
 (-1.208) (- 1.813)** (-1.613) (-2.324)** (.856) (-1.045)
 F/S ..............003 - .008 - .037 .011 - .020 .069
 (.215) (-.525) (-1.337) (.749) (-.527) (3.104)*
 2. .500 .575 .612 .728 .501 .627 F-ratio .......... 25.405* 20.836* 11.534 11.712* 4.352** 5.483**
 NOTE-The figures in parentheses are t-values.
 *Significant at the 1% level.
 **Significant at the 5% level.
 oo
 O,
 ;s
 t%
 t%
This content downloaded from 137.189.170.75 on Thu, 24 Nov 2016 08:44:44 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 TABLE 2
 LOGARITHMIC CROSS-COUNTRY REGRESSIONS EXPLAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH: EQUATION (4b)
 Total less Middle Middle East
 East and Southern Western and Southern
 Independent Total Europe Africa Hemisphere Asia Europe
 Variables (54 LDCs) (45 LDCs) (21 LDCs) (13 LDCs) (11 LDCs) (9 LDCs)
 Constant ......... 2.351 2.269 2.338 2.004 2.624 2.519
 (10.580)* (14.889)* (8.192)* (21.253)* (4.485)* (13.101)*
 IOCR ........... 1.335 1.314 1.174 1.848 1.200 1.145
 (9.176)* (8.632)* (6.027)* (9.279)* (3.169)* (3.282)*
 D/GE ............ -.098 -.139 -.164 -.130 -.035 -.142
 (-2.218)** (- 3.853)* (- 1.983)** (-4.925)* (-.150) (-.937)
 F/S .............. -.001 -.017 -.041 -.011 -.009 .071
 (-.113) (- 1.139) (- 1.516) (-.977) (-.205) (2.904)**
 R .............. .607 .626 .637 .882 .450 .613
 F-ratio .......... 28.343* 25.537* 12.704* 30.971" 3.729 5.431"*
 NOTE-The figures in parentheses are t-values.
 *Significant at the 1% level.
 **Significant at the 5% level.
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 Benoit's Formulations and Results
 Benoit used the following estimating equations to test the hypothesis
 that "defense expenditures reduce the resources available for invest-
 ment and so slow down growth."3
 Y, = f(I/Y, DIY) (5)
 Yg = f(D/ Y, F/Y) (6)
 Yg = f(I/Y, F/Y) (7)
 Yg = f(llY, DIY, F/Y), (8)
 where Yg is the average annual growth rate of the real nondefense
 GDP, F/Y the net receipts of bilateral economic aid to GNP ratio, IIY
 the investment ratio, and DIY the defense expenditure to GDP ratio.
 Support for the hypothesis will be shown by the presence of a sig-
 nificant negative relationship between Yg and DIY.
 The equations were estimated by linear stepwise regression analy-
 sis for a group of 44 LDCs over the period 1950-65. The results are as
 follows:4
 Yg = 0.6101 I/Y + 0.5366 DIY
 (4.9302) (4.0718) (5a)
 (0.2644) (0.1803),
 where R2 = .5540 and F = 25.4670;
 Yg = 0.3512 DIY + 0.1222 F/Y
 (2.4018) (0.7884) (6a)
 (0.0985) (0.0106),
 where R2 = .3002 and F = 8.7958;
 Yg, 0.6961 IIY + 0.5858 F/Y
 (6.2086) (4.6277) (7a)
 (0.3866) (0.2149),
 where R2 = .5886 and F = 29.3277; and
 Yg = 0.6612 IIY + 0.3418 F/Y + 0.2065 D/Y
 (5.5736) (2.3003) (1.3351) (8a)
 (0.3059) (0.0512) (0.0176)
 where R2 = .6061 and F = 20.5190.
 3 Benoit, "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries," p. 271.
 4 Ibid., p. 274.
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 The figures in the first row of parentheses are the t-values of the regres-
 sion coefficients while those in the second row are the contributions of
 the regression coefficients to the coefficient of determination (R2) of the
 estimating equation. The independent variables are presented in the
 order in which they appeared in the stepwise regression analysis.
 The coefficients of D/ Y in equations (5a) and (6a) came out positive
 and statistically significant, which led Benoit to conclude that defense
 spending stimulated rather than retarded economic growth. However,
 Benoit's results must be treated with some skepticism as they were
 obtained with the use of functional relationships that were inconsistent
 with the hypothesis to be tested and with the use of variables that were
 incorrectly measured. Benoit did not specify explicitly his framework
 of analysis. However, from his formulation of the problem it seems
 that he was implicitly testing the hypothesis, that there is a trade-off
 between defense expenditure and economic growth, within a Harrod-
 Domar framework. The hypothesis is that, for a given IOCR, a higher
 D/Y results in a lower I/Y and so a lower Yg. Therefore, D/Y and I/Y
 should not appear together as determinants in the same estimating
 equation. These two variables were included as determinants simulta-
 neously in estimating equations (5) and (8). In the case of equation (5)
 the regression coefficients of I/ Y and D/ Y were positive and statistically
 significant in the estimation. However, it is not possible to interpret the
 theoretical significance of the result for DI/Y within the Harrod-Domar
 framework. The same problem would arise over the interpretation of
 the result for equation (8) if the coefficient of D/ Y had been positive and
 significant in the estimation.
 The only estimating equation used that was consistent with the a
 priori case against defense spending is equation (6). However, the
 positive and significant coefficient obtained for D/ Y by using that equa-
 tion does not show that defense spending did not slow down invest-
 ment and so the rate of economic growth. F/Y is bilateral economic aid,
 a significant part of which may find its way into military expenditure
 programs. When a significant part of defense spending was financed
 out of bilateral economic aid, then D/Y simply measured the value of
 the external alternative source of funds and did not reflect the value of
 the domestic funds diverted from nonmilitary investment. The produc-
 tion of most military equipment with funds from external sources will
 increase economic growth. However, this is not the argument. The real
 issue is whether such military expenditure will deter economic growth
 if it were financed by funds meant for nonmilitary investment pro-
 grams. Such a displacement effect cannot, unfortunately, be captured
 by the use of equation (6), in which FlY is measured as bilateral eco-
 nomic aid.
 There is support for the contention that Benoit's D/IY is really F/Y
 in disguise to a large extent from Benoit's own results. First, it can be
 seen that I/Y and D/Y came out positive and significant in equation (5a),
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 and that I/l Y and FlY came out positive and significant in equation (7a).
 However, when D/Y and F/Y were entered as separate independent
 variables, in addition to I/Y, in equation (8a), the significance of F/Y
 dropped off markedly, while D/Y did not come out at all. This suggests
 that the use of both D/Y and F/Y diffused their separate influences on
 economic growth, a not unexpected result as D/Y and F/Y measured
 the same influence to a large extent. Second, when only D/Y and F/Y
 were used as determinants, in equation (6a), there was a similar dilu-
 tion of the separate effects of the two variables.
 Concluding Remarks
 The conclusion by Benoit that defense spending encouraged rather
 than hindered economic growth in LDCs can be questioned on two
 counts. First, the estimating equations used were not consistent with
 the hypothesis that was tested. Second, the measurement of some of
 the variables used left much to be desired.
 With the use of an estimating equation that was derived system-
 atically within an explicit conceptual framework, we obtained results
 that show that defense spending was detrimental to economic growth.
 There were, however, important regional differences. The adverse ef-
 fects that were marked in Africa and the Western Hemisphere were
 absent in Asia, the Middle East, and southern Europe.
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